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In-depth knowledge about specific national approaches to the use of digital evidence in criminal investigations is 
scarce. In order to substantiate claims about the ways in which new technologies are changing the face of criminal 
investigations (Holt et al. 2015), a clearer empirical insight into the current organisational arrangements adopted by 
law enforcement agencies is needed.  
 
Drawing on ethnographic and interview data collected as part of an Economic and Social Research Council funded 
project on the application of digital forensics (DF) in policing in England and Wales, this paper examines how police 
forces address the escalating demand for the examination of digital devices. It focuses on the introduction of the 
digital media investigator role (DMI) to support investigating officers with the collection and interpretation of digital 
information. The analysis presents the national and regional framework for deploying digital expertise in criminal 
investigations and examines some of the tensions inherent to the role through testimonies from DMIs, DF 
practitioners, investigating officers and police managers. The paper offers an original, empirically grounded 
perspective on the suitability of current arrangements in England and Wales as experienced by key actors in the 
criminal justice system. It contributes to the growing body of literature on the measures adopted by law enforcement 
agencies worldwide to manage the collection, processing, interpretation and use of information from digital devices 




In the United Kingdom, digital evidence has become more frequently used than any other types of 
evidence, with the recent Digital Forensic Strategy issued by the National Police Chiefs Council highlighting 
that over 90% of all crime recorded has now a digital element (NPCC 2020). Extending beyond CCTV 
footage, digital evidence is usually obtained using digital forensics (DF) techniques that involve the 
extraction of information from data storage media and the processing, analysis and interpretation of this 
information for intelligence purposes in investigations and criminal proceedings (Casey 2011:486). While 
DF is instrumental to accessing a vast and varied array of platforms and devices, its adequate provision for 
law enforcement agencies remains problematic. Several issues compound the routine use of DF in police 
investigations: the volume of data to be processed, for instance, has grown in parallel with the size of data 
storage capabilities. As digital crime becomes more easily facilitated through different platforms and easier 
access to networked communications, the identification of suspects and crime scene analysis are becoming 
increasingly complex (Horsman 2017). Amplifying these challenges are technical aspects - such as the 
reliability of digital data (Casey 2019, Sommer 2018), ethical dimensions surrounding the legitimacy, 
accountability and governance of digital information (Collie 2018, Tully et al. 2020), welfare concerns for 
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DF practitioners and officers, and adequate resources and training provisions for police and legal actors to 
understand digital evidence and identify how it can contribute to case outcomes (Cockcroft et al. 2018, 
Novak 2020). Although these issues are experienced globally, in-depth knowledge about specific national 
approaches to utilising DF and digital expertise as part of investigative strategies is scarce. With many 
decisions taking place before digital devices reach DF laboratories, a better understanding of the knowledge 
and provisions available at the early investigative stages is urgently needed. A clearer insight into the 
organisational barriers and professional challenges experienced in different national jurisdictions is also 
required to empirically substantiate claims about the ways in which new technologies are changing the face 
of criminal investigations (Holt et al. 2015).  
 
Using data from an Economic and Social Research Council project on the application of DF in policing in 
England and Wales, this article explores the embeddedness of DF expertise in police investigations. Like 
fingerprinting and crime scene examination, DF support is provided in the context of a fragmented forensic 
landscape, characterized by limited resources and a lack of national coordination and standardization. It is 
available through in-house, largely civilian specialist units. Focusing on the changing face of investigations 
in relation to the growing demand for digital expertise, the article examines the allocation and organization 
of related resources in four constabularies in England. It discusses the introduction of the digital media 
investigator (DMI) role by the Home Office in 2015 to assist frontline officers with digital knowledge and to 
lessen the pressure on specialist DF units (DFUs). In the forces studied the role was typically performed by 
police officers and involved evidence collection and processing, investigative decision-making and intra and 
inter-cooperation between operational units and DFUs. Drawing on ethnographic observations and in-
depth interviews with DMIs, DF practitioners, investigating officers belonging to different command units 
and police managers, the analysis explores the challenges involved in the collection, processing, 
interpretation and use of information from digital devices for evidential purposes.  
 
The paper is organised as follows: the next section introduces the socio-political background within which 
the development of digital capabilities has occurred in England and Wales and the national and regional 
parameters of deploying digital expertise in criminal investigations. The third section highlights some of the 
relevant issues identified in topical literature and is followed by an introduction of the research and its 
methodological framework. The fifth section discusses the emergent themes regarding the organisational 
tensions and professional dynamics between DMIs, DF practitioners and investigating officers, and the 
concluding section reflects on the implications of the findings for optimising the use of digital evidence in 




Worldwide, law enforcement agencies are transforming their approaches to policing in order to address 
the growing demand for digital investigations (Johansson 2019, Harkin et al. 2018, Holt et al. 2015). In 
England and Wales, the need for digital expertise has been extensively documented across policy analyses 
(NPCC 2020, HoLSTC 2019, Hitchcock et al. 2017, HMIC 2015, McGuire and Dowling 2013), practitioner 
studies (Cheshire 2018, Franqueira et al. 2018, Horvath et al. 2018, Horsman 2017) and academic research 
(Bossler et al. 2019, Wilson-Kovacs 2019, Jewkes and Andrews 2005). Recent estimates from the Office for 
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National Statistics suggest that cybercrime has now surpassed all other forms of crime in the United 
Kingdom (NCA 2020). The UK’s response to it has been managed through a combination of central and 
regional work through the National Crime Agency and the National Cyber Crime Unit, which offer reactive 
support, specialist capabilities and technical, strategic and intelligence input to local police forces. However, 
this targets only partially the investigative demand for digital expertise, being tailored to what has been 
described as ‘cyber-dependent’ crime, i.e., offences generated solely through the use of computers and 
networks, such as hacking, viruses and DDos attacks (McGuire and Dowling 2013). In contrast, ‘cyber-
enabled‘ crime refers to offences facilitated by digital technology, but not dependent on it, for instance 
those related to child sexual exploitation and abuse.  
 
Support for cyber-enabled offences has been historically provided through DFUs. In 2001 a National High-
Tech Crime Unit was established to coordinate responses to computer-based crimes, with most forces 
developing their own in-house versions since then. While at the time approximately 25% of investigations 
dealt with computer-mediated child sexual abuse (Jewkes and Andrews 2005), today this and related 
offences constitute over 80% of DFUs casework, an estimation reflected in figures for other national 
jurisdictions (Irvine 2010). Yet, DFUs are not a dedicated resource for these offences. Over the last twenty 
years, they have become a vital asset to all investigations, offering much needed specialist assistance with 
the extraction of digital information and the in-depth analysis of seized digital devices (NPCC 2020). In the 
decentralized policing system of England and Wales, marked by on-going budget cuts in government 
funding, investments in DFUs have not been prioritized. DFUs have to compete with other forensic services 
for available police resources, leading to backlogs and organisational tensions around DF availability 
(HoLSTC 2019; Sommer 2018; Tully et al. 2020) and prompting remarks that current demands for digital 
examinations are no longer sustainable (Horsman 2017). The fragmented nature of forensic provision and 
the difficulties in accounting for the ways in which it is supplied across the 43 forces in England and Wales, 
have also led to wider concerns about the quality and scientific reliability of the services provided (HCSTC 
2017).  
 
Acknowledging the need for DF knowledge and expertise outside DFUs, the Home Office introduced the 
Digital Media Investigator (DMI) role in 2015 in order to strengthen digital capabilities across police 
services. The role’s formal remit aligns to that outlined in The Digital Investigation and Intelligence 
Framework, which is to aid “major crime, incidents, operations or any investigation that require specialist 
digital investigative assistance” and to offer “assistance and advice in support of live incidents, 
investigations, gathering intelligence and conducting proactive/reactive investigations where digital 
technology and data acquisition opportunities exist” (Scriven and Herdale 20151). DMIs are envisaged to 
help frontline officers in their management of seized digital exhibits, and to work with digital evidence, 
deploying effective tools and developing data strategies for investigations. Recruitment into the DMI role 
is typically filled by officers upon completion of the College of Policing training. 
 
 
1 See also https://www.college.police.uk/What-we-do/Learning/Professional-Training/digital-and-cyber-
crime/Pages/DMI%20Programme---DMI-Hydra-Module.aspx 
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Following the Home Office guidance on the use of local, regional and national capabilities, the College of 
Policing has been training more than 1,500 DMIs since 2015 to mainstream digital skills across services2 
(Home Office 2018). The course covers technical expertise on Wi-Fi evidence, communication data, open 
source, vehicle telematics, Internet of things, digital forensics and cloud data. DMIs now provide the initial 
response to online sexual abuse and other cyber-enabled crimes, undertaking the preservation of evidence 
and management of complex investigations including international links to other agencies. They are 
assisted by a network of DMI coordinators linking the College of Policing and individual forces to tailor 
national training to local need. 
 
The number of DMIs used in each force and the remit of their work is decided locally by Chief Constables. 
This decentralised approach has led to various adoption models (Horvath et al. 2018): DMIs can operate 
(1) as a centrally based, stand-alone unit, (2) as embedded within basic command units, or (3) as a virtual 
support offering guidance as required, but whose officers are deployed in other full-time posts. While 
initially a centralised investment was made to support the DMI scheme and encourage its uptake across 
the 43 police forces, the expectation has been that constabularies would develop further their own DMI 
capabilities. However, given the sporadic funding since the initial investment most forces have struggled to 
maintain and grow their DMI capabilities.  
 
Digital Expertise in Policing  
 
Worldwide, social science scholars have commented on the reduced capacity of law enforcement agencies 
to deal with digital crime (Johnasson 2019, Harkin et al. 2018). Evaluating the impact of digital technologies 
on investigations, a growing body of literature focuses on the difficulties posed by the rapid escalation of 
cybercrime. While in operational policing the term ‘cybercrime’ is understood in the context of cyber-
enabled and cyber-dependent offences, in order to distinguish between new and old types of crime 
(McGuire and Dowling 2013), examinations of digital crime in the UK and elsewhere do not always follow 
this policy distinction. Some authors highlight the ambiguous use of the term ‘cybercrime’ and most 
analyses employ it as an umbrella category (De Paoli et al. 2020, Marion and Twede 2020). Common 
threads in existing literature show that police access to DF expertise varies by national jurisdiction, nature 
of the offence and type of investigation. Extant studies focus largely on crimes related to finance and fraud 
(Bossler et al. 2019), romance scams (Whitty and Buchanan 2012) and sexual abuse (Powell et al. 2019). 
Overarching themes in the current scholarship encompass the technical difficulties of investigating digital 
offences, the gaps in communication and networking between law enforcement and government agencies, 
jurisdictional issues, and the lack of training and police preparedness (Whelan and Harkin 2019).  
 
Extant empirical analyses are mostly quantitative. While noting the variety of law enforcement settings, 
they shed little light on the differences between national approaches to digital crime. For instance, in their 
analysis of officers’ job stress and satisfaction in the US, Holt and Blevins (2011) note how the availability 
of DF expertise varies according to the size of the organisation, with larger agencies able to accommodate 
full-time forensic examiners, and smaller ones having officers carrying out DF examiner roles in addition to 
 
2 For an overview of the training provided see https://www.college.police.uk/What-we-do/Learning/Professional-
Training/digital-and-cyber-crime/Pages/Digital-and-cyber_crime.aspx  
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their policing duties. Reflecting on these arrangements, the authors highlight the urgency in providing basic 
DF training to frontline officers, senior management and legal counsel, in order to increase familiarity with 
this new forensic domain and aid the prosecution of offences where digital evidence is prevalent.  
 
The gaps in the digital knowledge provision are also discussed in the small number of qualitative analyses 
available. These consider mostly jurisdictions outside the UK (Paoli et al. 2019), exploring for instance the 
introduction of cybercrime policing in the US (Holt 2013), the challenges experienced by Canadian forces 
in their investigation of sex crimes (Spencer et al. 2019) or the development of cybercrime divisions in 
Australian policing (Whelan and Harkin 2019). In the latter, the authors call for the need to explore the 
expansion of cybercrime divisions and understand their work in more depth. They observe how such units 
are underdeveloped and often isolated, have low visibility within the force, little acknowledgment from 
senior police managers and poor access to resources.  
 
Similar issues are documented by studies focused on the examination of sexual abuse offences. In her 
analysis of Swedish police investigations into child sexual abuse material, Johansson (2019) notes that while 
the police are dependent upon DF expertise, officers have limited access to it because of the ways in which 
this type of crime is prioritised. Similarly, in their study of police capabilities for the same type of offence in 
England and Wales, Jewkes and Andrews (2005) observed more than a decade earlier the scarcity of DF 
expertise and the lack of specialist training for investigative officers. Commenting on how the prioritisation 
of other types of crime historically regarded as more serious, resulted in longer waiting times for child 
sexual abuse investigations, Jewkes and Andrews also highlighted how the infrastructural inconsistencies 
across the 43 forces of England and Wales made intra and inter agency cooperation challenging. Despite 
consistent calls for more technical skills among investigators and better connections to DF expertise, extant 
research suggests that progress remains modest across many national jurisdictions. Furthermore, there is 
a knowledge gap regarding how different police systems have adapted to digital challenges and cope with 
DF demand and a notable lack of best practice guidance (albeit difficult, given the distinct historical settings 
and range of organisational arrangements). For these reasons, exploring national initiatives that nurture 
the development of digital expertise outside specialist DFUs is key.  
 
While there is a growing body of literature on the introduction of digital policing responsibilities in England 
and Wales (Bossler et al. 2019, Bryant et al. 2016, Cockcroft et al. 2018; Horsman 2017, Wall et al. 2015), 
there has been little focus on the DMI role in empirical research (Horvath et al. 2018, Schreuders et al. 
2018). As Horvath et al. (2018) note in their assessment of how the West Yorkshire constabulary 
implemented the DMI role, digital developments must concern the police as a whole, not only highly 
specialized DF work, which is regulated through accreditation mechanisms and international standards. 
Cybercrime is not exclusively a technical problem but affects law enforcement agencies in several other 
respects (Schreuders et al. 2018). Some of these relate to the existing infrastructures at force level and the 
lack of regional and national organisational frameworks to facilitate effective practice. Other issues pertain 
to the availability of personnel with digital expertise, material resources (such as software licenses and 
hardware equipment), education, certification and investments in the on-going training needed to keep DF 
practitioners up-to-date, victim support, and force-wide awareness of DF capabilities among officers 
(Schreuders et al. 2018). Additional concerns outline the processes of managing digital evidence, from 
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police case management systems to quality and standards frameworks, including ISO17025 accreditation, 
triage arrangements, and other data recording and sharing mechanisms both internally and across criminal 
justice agencies (such as the Crown Prosecution Service). Lastly, external developments and contexts, 
including links with the industry, national agendas and legislative frameworks, also impact on the 
effectiveness of investigations containing a digital element (Schreuders et al. 2018). The recent introduction 
of the Transforming Forensic Programme and the launch of the Forensic Capability Network3, have aimed 
to resolve some of these issues across the DF service support offered to forces in England and Wales, 




The methodological framework used in the present analysis is based on the need to understand 
investigative practices in-situ, as experienced by various key actors in the criminal justice system. An 
ethnographically embedded perspective was adopted to explore the practices and interactions between 
different forces and policing occupational groups, as well as other criminal justice actors. The discussion 
below draws on 270 hours of ethnographic observations undertaken between 2017 and 2020 at four police 
forces in England, each with its own DFU. While each force had its own ways of organizing DMI provision, 
the constabularies were linked by the specialist DF assistance provided by a regional forensic collaboration. 
Ethnographic observations covered technical processes and exchanges between DF practitioners and 
frontline officers submitting devices for analysis, team meetings and practitioner-related events. They were 
supplemented by 67 semi-structured interviews with DMIs, DF practitioners, and investigating officers as 
well as College of Policing training personnel, independent DF experts, prosecutors and senior forensic and 
police managers. Interviews explored the impact of DF development on criminal investigations through 
participants’ reflections on organisational change. Participants were recruited initially through institutional 
gatekeepers who helped disseminate information about the study and identify key contacts across the 
forces. Once fieldwork commenced, recruitment continued using a snowballing method, which allowed 
those interested in taking part to do so.  
 
During fieldwork, participants repeatedly referenced the DMI initiative, which subsequently led to 
interviewing 12 current and former DMIs across the four forces studied, 3 DMI supervisors, 5 Detective 
Chief Inspectors and one Detective Superintendent closely involved with the management of the DMI 
initiative locally. This provided 21 interviews (part of the 67 total) focused on the DMI role. In addition, 
other locally available practitioner information about DMI activities was used to corroborate interview 
findings and to provide a broader understanding of how the four forces managed digital evidence. Relevant 
national policy and internal guidance documents (e.g., Service Level Agreements and Standard Operating 
Procedures) were also reviewed to supplement the observational and interview data. 
 
Interviews lasted between 90-120 minutes and were audio recorded and transcribed. In order to 
understand how the DMI role had been implemented across the four forces and to find patterns across the 




interviews and fieldnotes were coded independently by the author and two other members of the research 
team. The codes were then compared for accuracy and differences between coders reviewed. Each code 
was then checked to ensure it provided specific information about the DMI role that could be collated into 
themes. Constant comparison between the interview and observational data was undertaken to confirm 
that the overarching themes reliably reflected participants’ views. The discussion below builds on these 
themes to capture the extent and suitability of recruitment and training into the DMI scheme, its adoption 
at force-level and occupational tensions across different groups involved in the identification and 
processing of digital evidence.  
 
Geographically, the four forces studied service between them a large rural area, a metropolitan zone and 
several cathedral cities. The two bigger forces each serve populations of about one and a half million and 
have around 3000 officers. The remaining two forces are smaller and more rural, each serving around 
700.000 people and employing about 1000 officers. In the year ending September 2020, the crime rate per 
1000 population in the region was 64.54. Notable differences between the forces were that almost half of 
the crime recorded in 2020 for one of the bigger forces was for violent offences, whereas for the other 
three, this counted for less than a quarter of all crime recorded in the region. While a large part of the DFU 
workload in the four forces included child sexual exploitation and abuse cases, DMI support was required 
in most instances, from major and serious incidents (such as homicide, rape and sexual assault), to 




a. Recruitment and Commitment 
 
Similar to Horvath et al.’s findings (2018), the ‘develop nationally-implement locally’ approach to the DMI 
initiative led to different adoption strategies according to the needs and priorities of each force, including 
the four discussed here. A tiered approach consisted of training a larger group of part-time DMIs, (on 
average 30 per force), who combined their DMI duties with non-digital related work, followed by 
establishing a smaller number of full-time DMIs who worked either from a centralised dedicated digital unit 
or were attached to operational units (typically major and serious crime teams). While advisory, DMI duties 
also included router downloads at crime scenes. Initial recruitment to the role was reportedly ‘slapdash’, 
having little strategic guidance and relying on officers declaring an interest in attending the training rather 
than a selection of potential candidates based on skills and experience. Participants observed how early 
recruitment ‘pushed’ officers into the role and described forces as keener to fill in the number of training 
slots provided by the Home Office, rather than test candidates. This resulted in some opting into the 
scheme to acquire digital expertise for their own cases, withdrawing from DMI duties afterwards. 
 
You’d like to think there was a formal application…the reality is we’re… a small force…the selection 






response of ‘yes’…the selection process beyond that, as far as I’m aware, there was none. (DMI, 
F2)  
 
While DMIs were described as ‘gold dust’ and ‘mana from heaven’ by senior police officers, expectations 
were also high, with DMIs anticipated to ‘be absolutely living, eating and beathing it’ (Chief Superintendent, 
F3). Technical skills, an understanding of what the role entails and commitment to on-going training were 
expected, together with an ‘investigative mindset’ to question and corroborate the digital information 
found.  
At organisational level, securing the assistance of a DMI by individual operational units had to be carefully 
navigated and justified on a case-by-case basis, because of the far wider implications for the resource-
strapped forces:  
 
We’re absolutely on the bones, to the extent…we were discussing the deployment of one officer, 
because if you take that one officer with a certain accreditation and skill-base from geographic 
policing, they have to bring with them a workload and with a workload you’re talking about victims 
and a standard of care that we all need to deliver but sometimes we can (find) wanting… (Detective 
Inspector, F3)  
As the original role formulation made no distinction between part and full-time duties, expectations led to 
high workloads experienced by part-time DMIs, similar to those reported by Horvath et al.’s participants 
(2018). Equally, part-time positions were seen by 62% of the interviewees as advantageous because these 
DMIs could reach more officers and improve the force’s resilience, while helping officers maintain 
previously gained competencies. Yet, balancing traditional policing tasks and DMI responsibilities could also 
be challenging.  
 
b. Part-time and Full-time Support into the Role   
 
Several analyses outline the need to actively maintain and evaluate digital literacy as digital skills quickly 
deteriorate if they are not continuously upheld (Harkin et al. 2018, Horsman, 2017). The DMIs interviewed 
highlighted a lack of guidance post-training, together with confusion about the duties and the remit of their 
role.  
 
I did the College of Policing week-long course back then…and then nothing really happened, it was 
one of them things when you went off on a course and then you came back and there wasn’t really 
any thought behind, how was that gonna be used? How was that gonna be deployed? (DMI, F3)  
 
They recalled how after training, self-motivation, rather than clarity on how the role should be enacted, 
directed their activities. Participants also discussed the burden of being both a police officer with a full 
workload and a part-time DMI. Professional development in these cases was particularly problematic. 
While full-time DMIs were managed by major or serious crime units allowing them to hone their skills and 
focus undisrupted on a small number of cases, part-time DMIs had far less control over their workload. As 
the latter remained located within their original teams, decisions to perform their DMI role rested with 
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their original line managers who tended to prioritise non-DMI work. This arrangement also affected the 
DMIs’ ability to maintain core competencies, with many reportedly withdrawing from DMI duties as a 
result.  
 
The…[part-time DMIs] that are dotted across the force have their own first and second line 
supervisors and…their own competing demands, invariably their own investigative workload…it’s 
quite hard because…they (must) be able to take the initiative to develop themselves and to 
continue to work within that function as Digital Media Investigators, ‘cos that is their only way 
(to)…maintain their competency in that field…if they’re actively doing it. But if they’ve got 10, 15, 
20 crimes on their workload…and then someone’s saying ‘can I borrow you for a week or two to 
assist with somebody else’s crime?’, that... is where the challenge is because…you’re always in a 
…struggle to get that balance between resourcing and demand right, and typically the demand 
outstrips the resources. (DMI coordinator, F1)  
 
Occasionally, the ability of the part-time DMIs to fulfill their duties was further restricted by additional 
specializations, such as being one of the few radio frequency surveyors in the force. Overall, DMIs preferred 
full-time duties as part of a major or serious crime operational team, an environment seen as ideal for 
pursuing a DMI pathway. Investigations undertaken as part of these teams were described by one of the 
DMI coordinators as ‘tried and tested’ having more structure and resources and involving the same ‘players’ 
(e.g., analysts, DFUs, telecoms) with ‘good working relationships’. Unlike many volume-based crimes where 
DMI involvement could be solicited mid-investigation and be ‘a little bit more ad-hoc’, in homicides for 
instance, the DMI would be engaged from the start and able to strategize the digital component of the 
investigation. Furthermore, unlike their part-time counterparts, full-time DMIs remained within a digital 
environment and could even be assigned the managerial task of coordinating the DMI provision in their 
force. Thus, full-time DMIs had more opportunities to train and could spend more time keeping their digital 
knowledge up to date.  
 
c. Digital Forensic Awareness  
 
Although a full-time DMI position was beneficial for individual development, most of those interviewed 
regarded the adoption of a centralized full-time DMI team model in two of the forces studied as detrimental 
to the upskill of digital literacy among frontline officers and in danger of silo-ing DMI provision while at the 
same time increasing the force’s dependence on its expertise.  
 
Commonly shared in the interviews was the wish for the entire workforce to upskill in order to cope with 
the demands raised by the digital aspects of investigations. Several issues were seen as preventing this 
upskill process: a shortage of training, a fear of digital processes and reluctance to engage with digital 
technologies, a lack of senior support and in some cases a preference to continue working within traditional 
lines of enquiry, chiefly due to the aforementioned issues. Furthermore, while senior management were 
said to demonstrate commitment to digital issues and needs, understanding what digital investigations 
involved highlighted the inability of some senior managers to engage:  
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If you’re dealing with traditional (crime) our senior leadership are great…brilliant leaders but they 
don’t necessarily engage with technology… so they don’t necessarily understand the complexities 
around it.  (DMI, F3)  
 
Reflecting on the evolution of the scheme, the DMIs noted its continuous improvement, with new recruits 
facing stronger competition and a more robust selection process. They also spoke wholeheartedly about 
the hands-on assistance they offered and the changes they brought to investigations, with officers more 
digitally aware, able to navigate digital-related administrative tasks and knowing where to seek help. 
Comprehending the scale and prevalence of digital investigations was often presented as a shift in police 
culture and notably attributed to DMI investigative input rather than DFU service. Most of those 
interviewed welcomed the idea of an accreditation process for DMI activities, believing it would help set 
standards and formally recognize their achievements, although concerns were expressed that aspects of 
digital work, such as radio frequency, could not be assessed in terms of an independent standard, a point 
also raised by DF practitioners. While the DMI role has been presented as advisory and tactical, in practice 
it ranged from helping officers in charge with paperwork applications to interpreting DF examination 
results. The latter arguably stretched the DMIs’ remit into the DF domain, raising concerns over quality 
control and creating frictions between the two groups.   
 
d. Fitting-In: Remit and Expertise  
 
Tensions related to occupational boundaries, responsibilities and ownership were noticeable during 
fieldwork. One area of contention was that of routers found at crime scenes. While the Association of Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO) Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence stipulates that 
“network detecting and monitoring is a specialist area and should not be considered without expert advice” 
(2012:16), the extent of the required expertise was locally determined. Given that DF examiners did not 
routinely attend crime scenes, handling the routers was typically tasked to DMIs. This arrangement was 
viewed unfavorably by the DF practitioners who wanted a more pro-active role in investigations and argued 
that potentially crucial information could be lost as the equipment was occasionally disconnected by less 
forensically aware officers. In one of the forces studied, another episode of misguide purchase stood out 
to illustrate the tensions around occupational boundaries, as one DMI coordinator explained:  
 
As part of the national project we bought a lot of technological kit… things like hard drive imagers, 
mobile phone downloaders… but we’re not authorized to use them for what they’re intended….The 
DFU chose not to really get involved…they could have directed us better to buy something that 
would be a triage tool rather than a full forensic tool…(F4) 
 
After purchase, it became apparent that the training offered by the supplier was also needed in order for 
the DMIs to operate the new equipment. As no further funds were available for this, the equipment 
remained unused. Furthermore, concerns about the reliability of the potential results and accreditation 
requirements surrounding the deployment of forensic tools for evidential purposes outside a controlled 
forensic environment, meant that even if training had been undertaken, the equipment could still not be 
used by DMIs. Escalating these tensions were the implementation of accreditation procedures for DFUs, 
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which contributed to growing paperwork and delays in the progression of cases. Although understood as 
necessary, accreditation preparations had challenging implications for the forces already dealing with 
unmanageable DF demand. 
 
Remarks such as ‘we can’t be trusted to download anything properly’ often accompany explanations of the 
DMIs’ wish to perform DF analyses:  
 
I think the most pressing thing…it’s the phones…because of the volume. So every single 
investigation, we now have a phone…do we look at it or not? And most of the time we do…If we 
were able to…download phones, that (would) help the investigation speed up…not only speed it 
up but give the phone back to people (and) avoid…getting complaints made about a phone been 
devalued by having it for two years, therefore buy me a new phone, 300 quid a go, that happens 
quite a lot.… And issues around the ISO…(DMI, F1) 
 
Prima facie, growing backlogs and slower than usual processing times, could seem that such an expansion 
of the DMI remit would be opportune. Equally, the willingness of DMIs to help beyond offering simple 
assistance, combined with a partial forensic knowledge, was seen as potentially endangering the 
robustness of the evidence produced. While acknowledging the inherent risk, DMIs believed an expanded 
forensic remit could enable them to do more for victims and investigations. Equally, DF practitioners 
recognized that DMIs helped redirect the numerous requests they received thus allowing the DFUs to focus 
on the cases where DF evidence was essential to the case, yet, most regarded the expanding DMI remit as 
problematic for its potential operational interference with accredited evidence-making processes. 
Moreover, investigating officers were also reluctant to encourage a DMI remit expansion because of the 
risk involved and inconsistencies in the implementation of the role.  
 
Similar occupational tensions between the operational and technical-scientific cultures of policing have 
been observed in relation to the position of the crime scene examiners (CSIs) at the launch of the DNA 
expansion programme in England and Wales5  (Williams 2001). As collectors of DNA evidence, CSIs became 
indispensable to the crime scene, however, like fingerprinting examiners before them, they were rarely 
recognised as expert collaborators to an investigation. Williams showed how police forces regarded the 
contribution of the forensic service support as a technical and mostly reactive component of investigations, 
an approach that persists today in many national jurisdictions, with senior police managers failing to 
recognise the multi-layered potential of forensics (Mousseau et al 2018). In our case, these historically 
embedded and culturally conflicting understandings of forensics are both illustrated and intensified by the 
initial lack of national coordination and individual force oversight in the adoption of the DMI role.  
 
 
5 The DNA Expansion Programme, launched in April 2000 in England and Wales, aimed to support the increase the 





The DMI scheme brings to fore on-going gaps in communication and a siloed approach to investigations 
that exacerbates occupational tensions. Similarly, in their analysis of cybercrime provision in England, 
Schreuders et al. (2018) observe how the remit overlap between crime control teams, DMIs, and Telecoms 
created ambiguities over responsibilities in relation to certain tasks. While crime control teams portrayed 
Telecoms as reluctant to share information on service providers, Telecoms described DMIs as demanding 
a ‘shopping list’ and lacking about what proportionate means for data requests involved. As in the 
discussion above, none of these units seem aware of the others’ contribution to investigation, with the 




Key to criminal justice outcomes, police investigations bring together distinct techno-scientific and 
operational occupational cultures (Kruse 2016). From an evidential perspective, the exponential rise in the 
use of digital technologies presents new challenges to the policing and forensic fields. Whereas in 
traditional forensics, the remits of fingerprinting and crime scene examiners are well established and 
ensure the seamless connection between the two cultures, DF remains a less familiar terrain for many 
officers, yet one they are increasingly facing as part of their investigations. Given the varied ways in which 
law enforcement agencies in different national jurisdictions adapt to digital challenges, there is urgent need 
to document these arrangements. The introduction of the DMI role in England and Wales illustrates a 
national initiative devised to increase the effectiveness of investigations and bridge techno-scientific and 
investigative realms. Designed to aid the identification of potential evidence and the interpretation of 
information at the early stages of an investigation outside DFUs, the role involves sworn officers with 
specialist capabilities (e.g., telecoms, open source, CCTV, mobile phone analysis). It has been implemented 
locally to address the escalating demand for digital expertise and the policing priorities of each force. DMIs 
draw on both fact-finding and technical skills to situate digital traces in a coherent investigative narrative 
and identify the potential for in-depth DF analysis. As such, their work should embed seamlessly with that 
of DF practitioners and investigative officers for best results.  
 
Providing an empirical examination of how the DMI role has been adopted in four English constabularies, 
this paper drew on the experiences of DMIs and DF specialists dealing with digital crime in a budget 
restricted policing landscape and a rapidly evolving technical environment. The findings illustrate the 
complex interlaying of the technical and the analytical, bringing to fore the tensions between the 
widespread recognition of the investigative potential of digital trace and the difficulties of coordinating 
activities and raising digital technical awareness among rank-and-file officers. While the introduction of the 
DMI role represents an important step towards bringing together the operational and the techno-scientific 
cultures of policing, a more systematic approach is needed to consolidate understandings of where digital 
evidence can be found, what it may entail and the mechanisms through which it can be extracted and 
interpreted.  
 
While the choice of using a model combining full and part-time DMI support reflects attempts to optimize 
current provision, it also has implications for the ways in which the digital expertise available for the 
investigation of different offences is distributed. For the part-time DMIs, the demand to juggle existing 
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workloads with acquiring and maintaining their technical specialization may result in a patchy provision of 
digital expertise to volume crime offences. Furthermore, backlogs experienced by most DFUs and their 
relative isolation from operational policing units, lead to few opportunities for sustained collaboration or 
sharing of expertise. A lack of national coordination in the implementation of the DMI role, has led to 
ambiguities over the role remit, fragmented training provision, rushed recruitment into the role and various 
tensions between DMIs and DF practitioners, all with long-term implications for the distribution and 
effective use of expertise in investigations. The findings highlight the need for the on-going training of 
criminal justice actors who routinely draw upon digital evidence in their investigations. From crime scene 
to court, digital evidence may be missed or misinterpreted due to a lack of adequate skills and knowledge 
(Casey 2019, Wilson-Kovacs 2019), an issue that requires increased attention in the context of current 
accreditation efforts (Page et al. 2019; Sommer 2018; Tully et al. 2020).  
 
This article contributes to the growing sociological and criminological literature with an ethnographically 
based perspective into the organisational and occupational tensions in the identification and processing of 
digital evidence in England and Wales. Its findings complement existing survey-based analyses (Bossler et 
al. 2019), renew calls to examine the challenges raised by the identification and processing of digital trace 
(Bryant et al. 2016, Cockcroft et al. 2018), and fill a gap in the current knowledge about policing responses 
to digital crime. The analysis is useful and important in several respects. First, it provides novel insights into 
the changing face of investigative work and the complex issues concerning the development of the DMI 
professional as experienced by past and present DMIs. Secondly, the analysis illustrates how the division of 
digital crime labour has been undertaken and some of the tensions over occupational boundaries, 
highlighting both the challenges raised by local arrangements and the fragmented and uneven support for 
officers in this role. Thirdly, it offers an empirical basis for the comparative study of how the DMI role has 
been implemented by law enforcement agencies, and its fit within broader organisational processes. A 
major limitation of the current analysis is its focus on only 4 out of the 43 forces in England and Wales.  
 
To conclude, the growing need for digital expertise in crime investigations has led to the recognition that 
dealing with demand cannot be solely confined to the specialist DF service support. The creation of the 
DMI role illustrates how digital technical skills must be understood as part of a spectrum of digital expertise 
that encompasses specialist teams, operational units and frontline officers. The development of the DMI 
role has brought to fore questions about the supply and demand of digital expertise, especially to volume 
crime offences, and frictions between techno-scientific and operational cultures within policing. The 
findings presented here suggest that while the introduction of the DMI role has been greatly needed, 
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